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Abstract - The alternative minimum tax (AMT) is a complex, 
unfair, and ineffi cient shadow tax system that threatens to affect 
32 million taxpayers by 2010, many of them solidly middle class. 
Under current law, repealing the AMT without offsets would cost 
more than $850 billion through 2017. This paper summarizes the 
current and projected effects of the AMT and considers options 
to fi nance repeal. One attractive option we consider would be to 
combine AMT repeal with a four percent tax on AGI in excess of 
$200,000 for married couples and $100,000 for others.
INTRODUCTION
The original minimum tax was an add–on tax intended to ensure that high–income people paid at least some tax. 
It has morphed and mutated into what is now the individual 
alternative minimum tax (AMT), a complex, unfair, and 
ineffi cient shadow tax system that threatens to hit 23 million 
households in 2007, many of them solidly middle class. 
Barring a change in law, it will affect 32 million taxpayers in 
2010—including half of those with incomes between $75,000 
and $100,000, and nearly 75 percent of married couples in 
that income range with two or more children. It will become 
the de facto tax system for taxpayers with incomes between 
$200,000 and $500,000, 94 percent of whom will owe AMT. 
And, though they were the original target of the tax, the 
highest–income taxpayers will remain relatively unaffected 
by the AMT, with only 39 percent of taxpayers earning more 
than $1 million in 2010 paying the AMT. In 2007, it would 
cost less in lost revenue to repeal the regular income tax than 
to repeal the AMT.1 
Clearly, the AMT has strayed far from the goals of the origi-
nal minimum tax, but repealing it would be quite expensive. 
This paper summarizes the current and projected effects of 
the AMT and considers options to fi nance repeal.2 The fi rst 
section describes how taxpayers calculate AMT liability. The 
second section documents the projected expansions noted 
above and examines the driving factors behind the trends. The 
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third section discusses equity, effi ciency 
and complexity issues. The fourth section 
examines reform options. The fi fth section 
concludes. 
THE INDIVIDUAL AMT: AN OVERVIEW
The AMT operates parallel to the regu-
lar income tax, with a different income 
defi nition, rate structure, and allowable 
deductions, exemptions, and credits.3 Tax-
payers calculate “alternative minimum 
taxable income,” subtract any applicable 
AMT exemption, and then calculate tax 
under the AMT tax rate schedule net of 
applicable credits to obtain tentative AMT 
liability, which is what would be owed 
by someone who paid taxes according to 
the AMT rules alone. AMT liability is the 
excess, if any, of tentative AMT above a 
measure of taxes due under the regular 
income tax.
Alternative minimum taxable income 
(AMTI) is the sum of taxable income for 
AMT purposes, AMT preferences, and 
AMT adjustments. Taxable income for 
AMT purposes is adjusted gross income 
(AGI) less itemized or standard deduc-
tions less personal and dependent exemp-
tions. Unlike regular taxable income, 
taxable income for AMT purposes can 
be negative. There is no interesting eco-
nomic distinction between preferences 
and adjustments in general; we will refer 
to both as preferences, which come in two 
varieties. Exemption preferences broaden 
the AMT tax base. Deferral preferences 
change the timing of the recognition 
of income and deductions, typically to 
accelerate income and postpone deduc-
tions; thus, they tend to raise the cur-
rent–year tax base, but at the expense of 
future tax bases. The vast bulk of AMT 
preferences are of the exemption variety. 
The largest are deductions for state and 
local taxes, which account for 59 percent 
of all preferences; exemptions for adults 
and dependent children (22 percent); 
and miscellaneous itemized deductions 
for items such as unreimbursed business 
expenses and certain legal fees (11 percent) 
(JCT, 2007). Thus, more than 90 percent of 
the preference items have little to do with 
what most people would think of as tax 
sheltering. In contrast, the deferral prefer-
ences are quite small and relate most fre-
quently to the treatment of incentive stock 
options (ISOs), depreciation of personal 
property, and passive activity losses. 
AMT exemptions, exemption phase-
outs, and tax brackets are not indexed 
for infl ation or adjusted for family size. 
As of this writing (June 2007), the AMT 
exemption is $45,000 for married couples 
fi ling jointly and for surviving spouses, 
$33,750 for unmarried individuals other 
than surviving spouses, and $22,500 for 
married individuals fi ling separately—the 
same amounts as applied prior to the 
enactment of the 2001 tax cuts. Since 
2001, Congress has enacted a series of 
temporary patches that have increased 
the AMT exemption amount substantially. 
For 2006, the exemption was $62,550 for 
couples and $42,500 for single fi lers and 
heads of household. The AMT exemptions 
phase out for high–income taxpayers at a 
rate of 25 cents per dollar of AMTI over 
thresholds of $150,000 for joint returns, 
$112,500 for singles, and $75,000 for mar-
ried individuals fi ling separately.4 In 2007, 
the phaseouts end at $247,500 for singles, 
$330,000 for joint returns, and $165,000 for 
married individuals fi ling separately.5
3 See JCT (2007) for an exhaustive discussion of AMT rules. A separate alternative minimum tax, which is similar 
in design to the individual AMT, applies to corporations. See Lyon (1997).
4 Besides the rules noted above, married taxpayers who fi le separately face additional provisions that aim to 
eliminate any AMT advantage of fi ling separately versus jointly.
5 The temporary increases in the value of the exemption also increase the income level at which the phaseout 
is complete. In 2006, the phaseout for married taxpayers ended at $400,200, for single taxpayers, at $282,500, 
and for married individuals fi ling separate returns, at $200,100.
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The statutory AMT tax rate is 26 percent 
on the fi rst $175,000 of income taxable 
under the AMT for married couples or 
singles ($87,500 for married taxpay-
ers fi ling separately) and 28 percent on 
additional amounts. The phaseout of 
the exemption, noted above, makes the 
effective marginal tax rate one–fourth 
larger than the statutory rate through the 
phaseout range. Thus, taxpayers with only 
moderately high incomes can face 35–per-
cent effective AMT rates (28 percent times 
1.25)—equal to the highest tax bracket 
under the regular income tax.
Under the AMT rules, long–term 
capital gains and dividends are subject 
to the same low rates as apply under the 
regular income tax.6 However, as under 
the regular tax, phaseouts can raise the 
effective tax rate on gains and dividends (as 
well as other income) above the statutory 
maximum rate. Since, as noted, the AMT 
exemption phases out at a 25 percent rate, 
the effective tax rate for taxpayers affected 
by the exemption phaseout is increased by 
6.5 percent for taxpayers in the 26–percent 
AMT bracket (25 percent of 26 percent 
equals 6.5 percent) and by seven percent 
for taxpayers in the 28–percent bracket 
(Leiserson, 2007). Thus, the maximum tax 
rate on capital gains and dividends is 22 
percent (the 15–percent statutory rate plus 
the seven–percent implicit surtax). 
As noted, AMT liability is the excess, 
if any, of the tentative AMT liability 
(reduced by any applicable foreign tax 
credit) over a tax liability measure based 
on the regular income tax. The latter mea-
sure is regular income tax liability before 
credits (that is, the tax due on adjusted 
gross income minus allowable exemp-
tions and deductions) less any taxes due 
because of lump–sum distributions and 
less any applicable foreign tax credit in 
the regular tax. For simplicity, we refer 
to this as “regular tax liability for AMT 
purposes.” 
After determining regular tax liability 
for AMT purposes and AMT liability, 
taxpayers return to the 1040 to calculate 
applicable credits. As of June 2007, the 
AMT does not restrict the use of personal 
refundable credits—the earned income 
credit and the child credit—or adoption 
and saver’s credits.7 Other personal non–
refundable credits, however, are allowed 
only to the extent that the individual’s 
regular tax liability exceeds the tentative 
AMT liability. That is, those credits are 
effectively disallowed against the AMT.8 
 6 In some cases, however, capital gains are treated differently under the AMT than under the regular income 
tax. When depreciation deductions are recalculated, for example, the adjusted basis of the asset—and, thus, 
the size and possibly the sign of any capital gain—will differ for regular tax and AMT purposes. Also, under 
the regular income tax, exercising an ISO generates no tax liability, but selling the stock generates capital gains 
tax on the difference between the sale price and the option price. Under the AMT, exercising a qualifi ed stock 
option generates taxable income equal to the difference between the exercise price and the option price if the 
stock is not sold in the same year. Selling the stock generates capital gains taxes, but only on the difference 
between the sale price and the exercise price.
  Prior to 1986, a portion of long–term capital gains was excluded from AGI, effectively lowering tax rates on 
gains by 60 percent. The excluded portion of capital gains was considered a preference item under the alterna-
tive minimum tax and was, in fact, the largest single preference item. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 abolished the 
capital gains exclusion under the regular income tax and the AMT preference item. When preferential rates on 
long–term capital gains were enacted in 1997, they were also allowed under the AMT. Tax legislation in 2003 
reduced the capital gains tax rate and also applied it to qualifying dividends for both the regular income tax 
and the AMT.
 7 The earned income tax credit, child credit, and adoption credit are allowed against the AMT by provisions 
in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) and will sunset with the rest of 
the law in 2010.
 8 The personal non–refundable credits include the child and dependent care credit, the credit for the elderly 
and disabled, the Hope and Lifetime Learning credits, the credit for interest on certain home mortgages, and 
other less–frequently claimed credits (JCT, 2007).
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A temporary provision that allowed the 
use of those credits expired at the end 
of 2006. The general business credit can 
reduce tax only to the level of tentative 
AMT liability, but unused portions may 
be carried backward or forward. Finally, 
AMT liability that is the result of tim-
ing–related preferences or adjustments 
generates a regular income tax credit that 
may be used against future income taxes 
if the taxpayer moves off the AMT.
Box 1 shows the calculation of AMT 
for a married couple with four children 
earning $75,000 in 2007. It illustrates how 
the AMT will ensnare even middle–class 
families with very straightforward tax 
returns if Congress does not act.
TRENDS AND CAUSES
History and Projections 
To project future AMT participation 
and revenue, we use the Urban–Brook-
ings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation 
model.9 Table 1 shows that in 2006, the 
AMT affected about four million taxpay-
ers. With the expiration of the temporary 
AMT patch, the number of AMT taxpayers 
will increase dramatically to 23 million in 
2007 and 32 million, more than one–third 
of all taxpayers, in 2010. With the expira-
tion of most of the 2001–2006 tax cuts in 
2011, the number of AMT taxpayers will 
fall to 18 million, before again marching 
steadily upward to hit 39 million by 2017. 
If, instead, the tax cuts are extended, as 
proposed by the President, almost half of 
all taxpayers—53 million—will pay the 
AMT by 2017. 
AMT revenue follows a similar pat-
tern, rising from $24 billion in 2006 to $70 
billion in 2007 and $117 billion by 2010.10 
Table 1 provides two other ways to gauge 
the quantitative signifi cance of the AMT. 
By 2010, tax returns that face the AMT 
will account for 52 percent of all AGI, up 
from 15 percent in 2006. More strikingly, 
we estimate that repealing the regular 
income tax—including all personal tax 
credits—would reduce income tax rev-
enues by less ($63 billion) than repealing 
the AMT ($70 billion) in 2007.
Ironically, although the tax was intended 
to target the rich, people with only mod-
estly high incomes are much more likely 
to be subject to the AMT than are million-
aires. AMT participation rates rise with 
income up to the $200,000 to $500,000 level 
and then decline at higher levels (Table 
2). People with moderately high incomes 
face much higher effective tax rates under 
the AMT than under the regular income 
tax because of the phaseout of the AMT 
exemption, which, as noted, creates effec-
tive tax rates as high as 35 percent. Very 
high–income taxpayers, whose incomes 
are well above the exemption phaseout 
range, in contrast, face a 35–percent rate 
under the regular income tax but only 
a 28–percent rate under the AMT. Thus, 
unless they have large AMT preferences, 
they pay more under the regular tax sys-
tem. In 2006, only 31 percent of fi lers with 
 9 The data are taken from the stratifi ed, random sample of tax returns contained in the 2001 public–use fi le 
produced by the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service. See also Rohaly, Carasso, and 
Saleem (2005). We use the term participation as convenient shorthand to refer to individuals who owe AMT, 
who lose personal credits because of the AMT, or who choose to take itemized deductions that are lower than 
their standard deduction in order to reduce or eliminate their AMT liability. Our estimates differ slightly from 
those reported by the Joint Committee on Taxation (2007) because of differences in underlying datasets, and 
assumptions about growth of income over time and other factors. The small differences are well within the 
range of estimation uncertainty.
10 Technically, the fi gures reported in the table and discussed in the text refer to calendar–year AMT liabilities, 
not revenue. A portion of calendar–year tax liabilities is not collected as revenue until fi nal tax returns are 
fi led and fi nal–quarter estimated taxes are paid in the following calendar year.
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Box 1. Calculating the AMT
A married couple with four children has an income of $75,000 from salaries and interest on their savings 
account. Under the regular income tax, the family can deduct $20,400 in personal exemptions for themselves 
and their children. They can also claim a $10,700 standard deduction. For the regular tax, their taxable 
income of $43,900 places them in the 15 percent tax bracket, and they owe $5,803 in taxes before calculating 
the AMT or tax credits. Some, but not all, tax credits are allowed against both the AMT and the regular tax 
in 2007. Most importantly for this family, the child tax credit is allowed against both.
To calculate AMT liability, the couple adds their preference items—personal exemptions of $20,400 and the 
standard deduction of $10,700—to taxable income and subtracts the married–couple exemption of $45,000, 
yielding $30,000 in income subject to AMT. That amount is taxed at the fi rst AMT rate of 26 percent, for a 
tentative AMT liability of $7,800. The AMT equals the difference between the couple’s tentative AMT and 
their regular income tax, or $1,997.
Several points about this example are worth noting. First, the family is on the AMT because they have four 
children, not because they are rich or aggressive tax shelterers. Second, this tax situation is about as simple 
as it gets; the family has no deferral preferences, no itemized deductions, no capital gains, no AMT credits 
from previous years, and no other complicating factors. Third, the couple will receive no long–term benefi t 
from regular tax rate reductions, because their income tax liability is set by the AMT, not the regular income 
tax. Finally, as long as the AMT is not indexed to infl ation, the couple’s future tax payments as a share of 
their income will rise, even if their real (infl ation–adjusted) income does not change.
AMT Calculation
Married couple fi ling jointly with four children, 2007
Calculate Regular Tax Calculate Tentative AMT
Gross income       $75,000 Taxable income    $43,900
Subtract deductions 
 Personal exemptions $20,400
  (6 x $3,400)
 Standard deduction    $10,700
Add preference items
 Personal exemptions $20,400
 Standard deduction  $10,700
AMTI         $75,000
Taxable income      $43,900 
Tax before credits*   $5,803
Subtract AMT exemption
 AMT exemption   $45,000
(Tax bracket) 15% Taxable under AMT   $30,000
Tax (tentative AMT)*   $7,800
First $15,650 taxed at 10%
Next $48,050 taxed at 15% (AMT bracket) 26%
First $175,000 taxed at 26%
AMT = the excess of tentative AMT over regular income tax
AMT = $7,800 - $5,803 = $1,997
* If the children are under age 17, the family could reduce its tax liability by $4,000 because of the child tax 
credit. This credit is allowed against both the regular income tax and the AMT.
incomes above $1 million were affected 
by the AMT, compared to 51 percent of 
those with incomes between $200,000 and 
$500,000. By 2010, the difference is even 
starker: 94 percent of those in the $200,000 
to $500,000 income class will be affected 
by the AMT compared to 39 percent of 
those with income above $1 million. 
Over time, the tax is steadily encroach-
ing on families that most would consider 
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middle– or upper–middle–class. By 2010, 
half of all tax filers making between 
$75,000 and $100,000 will pay the AMT, 
up from 36 percent in 2007 and less than 
one percent in 2006.11
Taxpayers with large families, those 
who live in high–tax states, and those fi l-
ing jointly are more likely than others to 
be affected by the AMT (Table 2). These 
characteristics can combine to create 
very high probabilities of falling prey to 
the AMT. For example, absent a change 
in law, by 2010, 89 percent of married 
couples with income between $75,000 and 
$100,000 and with two or more children 
will face the AMT compared to less than 
one percent in 2006.
Although not shown in the table, tax-
payers with signifi cant legal fees incurred 
in cases that generate taxable damages, 
such as punitive damages or damages for 
nonphysical injuries, are also likely to face 
the AMT. Such expenses are deductible 
under the regular income tax as miscel-
laneous itemized deductions (subject to 
a two–percent fl oor) but are not allowed 
under the AMT. That is, the full damage 
award is included in AMTI even though 
the net gain to the taxpayer is the income 
less the legal fees. As a result, a taxpayer 
with substantial legal fees will have much 
more taxable income under the AMT than 
under the regular tax. If the legal fees are 
high relative to the damage award, the 
taxpayer can actually owe more AMT 
than her net gain from a lawsuit (John-
ston, 2003).
Sources of AMT Growth
Minimum taxes and the regular income 
tax have generally been modified in 
conforming ways over time. The two 
major exceptions—the failure to index the 
minimum tax for infl ation in 1981 when 
the regular income tax was indexed and 
the absence of sustained AMT tax cuts 
in 2001—are the central factors behind 
the AMT’s projected growth. Because 
the AMT is not indexed for inflation, 
growth in nominal income tends to raise 
AMT liability more than regular income 
tax liability. The 2001–6 tax cuts reduced 
regular income tax liability, but made only 
minor and temporary changes to the AMT. 
Both factors tend to push people onto the 
AMT over time. 
For example, in 2007, 23.4 million 
taxpayers will be on the AMT under 
current law. If the 2001–6 tax cuts had 
not occurred, however, only 10.2 million 
would have been affected by the AMT. If 
the tax cuts had not occurred and the AMT 
exemption amounts had been indexed for 
infl ation along with the regular income tax 
in 1985, only 300,000 taxpayers would face 
the AMT in 2007.
 Lindsey (2000) attributes a substantial 
effect to the AMT changes made in 1993.12 
In fact, however, the 1993 changes, which 
raised rates in both the regular income 
tax and the AMT, but also increased the 
AMT exemption, served on net to reduce 
the number of AMT taxpayers. While 23.4 
million taxpayers will face the AMT in 
11 Tax fi lers include all nondependent tax units fi ling an income tax return, regardless of whether they owe income 
tax. Taxpayers include all nondependent returns with positive income tax liability. The Joint Committee on 
Taxation (2007) reports estimates for “taxpayers,” which they defi ne as all tax–fi ling units, including those 
that do not fi le tax returns and dependent returns.
12 Lindsey stipulates two principles of “equitable minimum tax design”—that a family of four at the top of the 
15 percent bracket claiming the standard deduction, four exemptions, and $10,000 of preference items should 
not be subject to the AMT; and that AMT rates should be no higher than 80 percent of regular tax rates—and 
argues that the changes made in 1993 violated these principles and, therefore, caused the increase in the num-
ber of middle–income taxpayers potentially subject to the AMT. Using Lindsey’s taxonomy, violations of the 
fi rst principle are the primary source of growth in the number of taxpayers potentially affected by the AMT. 
However, while Lindsey implies that the 1993 changes resulted in violations of the principle for the fi rst time, 
the principle was violated before the 1993 changes were implemented and the 1993 law actually caused fewer 
middle–income families to be affected by the AMT.
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2007 under current law, if the AMT rates 
and exemption remained at their pre–1993 
levels, we estimate that 26.6 million tax-
payers would face the AMT. 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
Potential Justifi cations
A key political rationale for an AMT is 
to ensure that all high–income households 
pay at least some federal income tax every 
year. On strictly economic grounds, there 
is little logic behind such a goal: the goal 
confuses tax payments with tax incidence; 
it focuses on an arbitrary measure of time; 
it focuses on one tax, rather than the tax 
system as a whole; and it seems to sug-
gest that legally reducing tax burdens by 
$1 starting from a large positive number 
is acceptable, but reducing it from $1 to 
zero is not (Shaviro, 1988, 2001). Despite 
the cold logic of these claims, the failure 
of some high–income households to pay 
any income tax seems to be viewed by 
the public as a signal of serious inequities 
in the tax system.13 Public opinion cre-
ates important constraints on legislative 
outcomes, regardless of the economic 
merits of such views. To the extent that 
it improves perceived equity, the AMT 
could have value. 
However, even with the AMT, some 
high–income tax fi lers still avoid all fed-
eral income tax. Balkovic (2006) reports 
5,839 tax returns with expanded income 
over $200,000 (or 0.2 percent of returns 
in that income class) reported no U.S. 
income tax in 2003.14 Of those returns, 
4,934 reported no worldwide income tax 
either. Not surprisingly, tax–exempt bond 
interest is the largest factor contributing 
to tax–exemption on almost two–thirds 
of returns exempt from worldwide tax. 
Deductions for high medical and dental 
expenses were the largest factor on 12 
percent of returns.
A second potential rationale could arise 
from second–best or political economy 
considerations (Graetz and Sunley, 1988; 
Shaviro, 2001). The claim is that the regu-
lar tax contains features that are ineffi cient 
or inequitable but that are diffi cult, for 
political reasons, to shut down or directly 
modify. If so, it may be more feasible to 
make changes indirectly via a minimum 
tax. These arguments, however, depend 
on the implicit assumption that AMT 
rules—made by the same political agents 
who are subject to the same political con-
straints as when they make changes in 
the regular tax—are somehow easier to 
enact than regular tax rules. It is unclear 
why this should be true. Even if it is true 
in principle, we see little evidence that 
the current AMT functions as posited. For 
example, when tax rates on long–term 
capital gains were capped under the 
regular income tax in 1997, they were also 
capped under the AMT, even though the 
difference in tax rates between capital 
gains and ordinary income is probably 
the single largest factor behind individual 
income tax shelters (Burman, 1999).
Distributional Effects
The AMT is more progressive overall 
than the regular income tax (Table 3). In 
2006, the AMT and regular tax collected 
about the same share of their revenues 
from taxpayers with incomes above $1 
million. The biggest differences occur 
13 When Treasury Secretary Joseph Barr testifi ed before Congress that 155 households with incomes over $200,000 
($1.3 million in 2007 dollars) had owed no income tax on their 1967 tax returns, it unleashed a fi restorm of 
protest. Congress received more letters about that than they did about the Vietnam War in 1969 (Graetz, 
1999).
14 “Expanded income” is a broad measure of income intended to better represent economic status than AGI. It 
includes tax–exempt interest, nontaxable Social Security benefi ts, and AMT preference items as well as several 
other adjustments (Balkovic, 2006).
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for taxpayers with cash income between 
$200,000 and $1 million—where the AMT 
collects 64 percent of its revenues and 
the regular tax collects 30 percent—and 
taxpayers with income between $30,000 
and $200,000—where the AMT collects 
eight percent of its revenue compared to 
48 percent for the regular tax.
The progressivity of each tax is slated to 
decline over time, however. The income 
tax share paid by taxpayers with income 
over $1 million falls from 25 percent in 
2006 to 21.5 percent in 2010. The share 
paid by those with income above $500,000 
falls from 35 percent to 31 percent, even 
though the share of all taxpayers in that 
category rises. These declines occur 
because the 2001–06 tax cuts are regres-
sive, especially among the top one percent 
of all taxpayers (Leiserson and Rohaly, 
2006). Changes in the distribution of 
AMT payments are even more dramatic. 
By 2010, the AMT will collect only eight 
percent of its revenue from taxpayers 
with income over $1 million and 16 per-
cent from taxpayers with income above 
$500,000. The analogous fi gures for 2006 
are 27 percent and 47 percent. The decline 
in AMT share for high–income taxpayers 
is due to the explosive growth in the num-
ber of AMT taxpayers with lower incomes. 
The share of AMT paid by taxpayers with 
income between $30,000 and $100,000 
rises from less than one percent in 2006 to 
11 percent in 2010, and the share paid by 
taxpayers with income between $100,000 
and $200,000 rises from eight percent in 
2006 to 34 percent in 2010. 
Narrow Base, High Rates
Commentators often characterize the 
AMT as a tax system with a broad base 
and low marginal tax rates. This character-
ization is wrong. By 2010 almost all AMT 
taxpayers will face a smaller tax base and 
higher marginal tax rates in the AMT than 
they would in the regular tax. Only for 
the two percent of AMT taxpayers with 
income above $500,000 will the AMT base 
be broader and AMT rates be lower than 
in the regular tax (Table 4).
The confusion over the tax base arises in 
part because, for most taxpayers, AMTI is 
the sum of taxable income in the regular 
tax plus AMT preferences and adjust-
ments. Because the last two items are 
virtually always positive, AMTI virtually 
always exceeds taxable income.15 How-
ever, although taxable income is the base 
in the regular tax, AMTI is not the base in 
the AMT. The AMT base is the difference 
between AMTI and the AMT exemption. 
Thus, any AMT taxpayer with preferences 
and adjustments that are smaller than the 
allowable AMT exemption will have more 
income subject to tax in the regular tax 
than in the AMT (where income subject 
to tax under AMT is AMTI minus exemp-
tions). In 2006, about 63 percent of AMT 
taxpayers have more income subject to 
regular income tax than subject to the 
AMT (Table 4). The vast majority of AMT 
taxpayers with income between $30,000 
and $200,000 simply do not have enough 
preferences and adjustments to make 
their AMT base exceed their regular tax 
base. 
So why do these taxpayers owe AMT? 
The reason is that, again contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the AMT imposes 
higher tax rates on most taxpayers than 
the regular income tax. For those with 
modest incomes subject to the AMT, 
the lowest AMT rate of 26 percent is 
much higher than the average tax rate 
they face under the regular income tax, 
and often higher than the marginal tax 
rate as well. (Ninety–fi ve percent of tax 
units faced marginal rates of 25 percent 
15 For taxpayers with negative regular taxable income for AMT purposes (defi ned above), regular taxable income 
in the regular tax is set at zero, so that AMTI may be less than regular taxable income in rare cases even if 
adjustments and preferences are positive.
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or lower under the regular income tax 
in 2006.) Moreover, as noted earlier, in 
the phaseout range for the AMT exemp-
tion, effective marginal tax rates are 32.5 
percent or 35 percent. This is why almost 
three–quarters of taxpayers with incomes 
between $200,000 and $500,000 face a 
higher marginal tax rate under the AMT 
than under the regular income tax in 2006 
(83 percent in 2010).
Overall, in 2006, 71 percent of AMT tax-
payers had a higher effective marginal tax 
rate in the AMT. By 2010 this fi gure will 
rise to 89 percent. Only among AMT tax-
TABLE 4
INCOME SUBJECT TO TAX AND EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES IN THE REGULAR INCOME TAX 
AND THE AMT AMONG AMT TAXPAYERS, CURRENT LAW1
Cash Income Class 
(thousands of 2006$)2
All
Less than 30
30–50
50–75
75–100
100–200
200–500
500–1,000
More than 1,000
Percent with More 
Income Subject to 
Tax In3
Regular 
Tax 
62.6
 0.0
81.4
90.3
94.3
88.9
63.2
 9.5
11.4
AMT
 37.5
100.0
 18.6
  9.7
  5.7
 11.1
 36.8
 90.5
 88.6
Average 
Adjustments 
and Preferences4
 45,997
162,345
 52,499
 31,023
 31,614
 35,408
 34,673
 58,238
288,691
Percent with a 
Higher Marginal 
Tax Rate In5
Regular 
Tax
25.8
 0.0
 0.0
 0.0
 1.8
 5.8
25.2
68.1
62.2
AMT
71.4
99.8
99.4
98.2
93.1
85.7
74.0
29.8
33.6
Average Effective
Marginal Tax Rate 
(percent)6
Before 
AMT
29.3
 0.0
 2.3
17.2
21.2
25.3
31.2
31.0
26.9
After 
AMT
31.5
32.2
26.3
26.2
27.3
29.4
33.2
28.8
26.6
2006
Cash Income Class 
(thousands of 2006$)2
All
Less than 30
30–50
50–75
75–100
100–200
200–500
500–1,000
More than 1,000
Percent with More 
Income Subject to 
Tax In3
Regular 
Tax 
87.3
58.2
98.6
98.7
98.9
97.0
43.2
10.8
10.7
AMT
12.7
41.8
 1.4
 1.3
 1.1
 3.0
56.8
89.2
89.3
Average 
Adjustments 
and Preferences4
 23,888
 36,700
 15,368
 19,134
 18,488
 20,979
 31,209
 64,292
290,894
Percent with a 
Higher Marginal 
Tax Rate In5
Regular 
Tax
 7.1
 0.0
 0.0
 1.9
 1.0
 5.8
15.9
69.7
53.9
AMT
89.0
93.1
95.9
90.3
92.1
92.0
83.3
25.9
34.3
Before 
AMT
23.9
 7.1
16.4
18.0
19.3
25.8
29.2
31.0
27.4
After 
AMT
28.1
27.6
25.6
24.9
26.2
28.4
32.5
28.3
27.1
2010
Source: Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006–1).
(1) AMT taxpayers include those with AMT liability from Form 6251, with lost credits, and with reduced deduc-
tions.
(2) Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals. 
Includes both fi ling and non–fi ling units. Tax units that are dependents of other taxpayers are excluded from the 
analysis. For a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm.
(3) Income subject to tax for the regular income tax is taxable income; for the AMT, it is AMTI net of the AMT 
exemption.
(4) Amounts are in nominal dollars to facilitate comparison with AMT, exemption amounts.  For 2006, the AMT 
exemption is $62,550 for married couples fi ling jointly and surviving spouses; $42,500 for unmarried individu-
als other than surviving spouses; and $31,275 for married individuals fi ling separately. For 2010, the exemption 
amounts are $45,000, $33,750, and $22,500, respectively. 
(5) The marginal tax rate for each return is calculated by adding $1,000 to wages, recomputing income tax net of 
refundable credits, and dividing the resulting change in tax liability by 1,000. 
(6) Marginal tax rates represent a simple average across individuals.
Average Effective
Marginal Tax Rate 
(percent)6
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payers with income greater than $500,000 
does the AMT usually represent a cut in 
effective tax rate. Even in that group, how-
ever, 26 to 34 percent face higher marginal 
rates under the AMT. 
Complexity 
Although meaningful quantitative 
indicators of tax complexity are diffi cult 
to obtain, the prima facie case that the AMT 
is complex is overwhelming, and both the 
National Taxpayer Advocate (2001) and 
the IRS (2000) highlight the AMT as one 
of the most diffi cult areas of the tax law 
to comply with and administer. The key 
issue, though, is not the overall level of 
complexity, but rather what complexity 
allows policy makers to achieve in terms 
of equity, effi ciency or other goals (Gale 
and Holtzblatt, 2002). 
The deferral preferences and the calcu-
lation of the AMT credit are particularly 
complex. The only purpose of such rules 
is to ensure that all high–income taxpay-
ers pay some federal income tax in each 
year, and as noted above, the AMT fails 
to achieve that goal. AMT complexity is 
also a signifi cant and increasing problem 
for middle–class taxpayers for several rea-
sons. First, AMT taxpayers with income 
below $100,000 have estimated average 
AMT liability in 2010 of less than $1,300, 
so the ratio of compliance costs to rev-
enue raised is likely to be high. Second, 
the AMT makes the calculation of capital 
gains taxes and nonrefundable credits 
signifi cantly more complex. Third, a large 
share of middle–class taxpayers who fi ll 
out the AMT forms end up not owing any 
AMT (National Taxpayer Advocate, 2001; 
IRS, 2000). It is hard to see any policy goal 
achieved by fi lling out superfl uous forms. 
Interactions with the regular income 
tax can also be a source of complexity, 
but serve effi ciency goals in particular 
cases. For example, the AMT’s taxation 
of private activity bond interest income 
will reduce the subsidy afforded such 
investments in the regular tax and might 
improve effi ciency. 
Some assert that the complexity of cal-
culating taxes under both the regular tax 
and the AMT does not pose a real problem 
because most affected taxpayers rely on 
tax preparation software, which calculates 
the AMT automatically, or paid tax pre-
parers. Although it is true that software or 
paid preparers reduce the computational 
complexity of the AMT, it turns the tax 
system into an inscrutable black box for 
many people.
In order to make informed decisions 
about work, saving, retirement, educa-
tion, and other important matters, people 
should understand how the tax system 
affects those choices, but the AMT leads 
to endless confusion. Taxpayers will have 
a hard time predicting their marginal tax 
rate if they do not know whether they will 
be on the AMT. In addition, many people 
may be confused about what constitutes 
an AMT preference item. For example, 
Consumer Reports magazine reported in 
the February 2007 issue that the AMT 
is “snagging middle–income taxpayers 
with big families, people who pay lots of 
state tax, and those with high mortgage 
interest.” Mortgage interest, of course, is 
not an AMT preference item (except on 
home equity lines and second mortgages 
used to pay for nonhousing expenses). 
And needless complexity contributes to 
public perceptions that the income tax 
system is unfair.
Moreover, computer software has its 
limitations. For example, individuals who 
were on the AMT in the previous year 
must fi gure out the state tax deduction 
that would have been allowed on their 
prior–year tax return before they were 
subject to the AMT. This is necessary in 
order to fi gure out how much of their 
state tax refund in the current year is tax-
able. This calculation is so complex that 
TurboTax does not do it. The software 
recommends that the taxpayer go back 
to his or her prior–year return, and keep 
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refi guring the state tax deduction over 
and over until the AMT gets down to 
zero. This is complex even with software. 
In general, the AMT provisions that link 
liability across years and require multiple 
accounting systems on an asset–by–asset 
basis prove diffi cult even for advanced 
software programs (Shaviro, 2001).
POLICY OPTIONS
An ideal solution would address the 
AMT in the context of a complete over-
haul of the tax system. Such changes are 
beyond the scope of this paper, however, 
and are not politically likely any time 
soon. Accordingly, we focus on options 
to repeal the AMT in a fi scally responsible 
manner—that is, without increasing the 
defi cit over the ten–year budget period. 
There is an infinite array of possible 
options. We focus on fi ve to illustrate the 
options and trade–offs. A more detailed 
list is in Burman, Gale, Leiserson, and 
Rohaly (2007). We also briefl y discuss the 
option of eliminating the regular income 
tax while retaining the AMT.
Repeal the AMT
Repealing the AMT in 2007 without 
offsetting the revenue lost would elimi-
nate the AMT’s drawbacks, but it would 
signifi cantly increase budget defi cits and 
be regressive. The revenue loss would 
be $106 billion in 2010 and $852 billion 
through 2017 under current law. If the 
President’s tax cuts are extended, the cost 
would approximately double to about $1.7 
trillion. Filers in the top one percent would 
receive an average reduction in taxes 
equal to 1.1 percent of after–tax income 
in 2007 (Table 5). Those in the 95th to 99th 
percentile would see an average increase 
in after–tax income of 2.6 percent.
Eliminating the AMT would also 
increase the number of high–income 
households that paid little or no income 
tax. We estimate that about 4.5 percent of 
tax units with cash incomes over $1 mil-
lion would pay less than one percent of 
their income in income tax in 2007 with-
out an AMT, up from 2.8 percent under 
current law.16 This estimate assumes no 
change in behavior. To the extent that the 
AMT deters tax sheltering, its elimination 
TABLE 5
AMT REPEAL OPTIONS: PERCENT CHANGE IN AFTER–TAX INCOME BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, 
20071
Offset Option
No offset (stand–alone repeal)
4% of AGI add–on tax above 100K/200K
Repeal state and local tax deduction, 
 decrease all income tax rates
Increase all income tax rates
Increase top three income tax rates
Roll back capital gains rates, increase 
 top three income tax rates
0–20
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20–40
 0.0
 0.0
 0.0
–0.1
 0.0
 0.0
40–60
 0.0
 0.0
 0.0
–0.3
 0.0
 0.0
60–80
 0.2
 0.2
–0.1
–0.4
 0.2
 0.1
80–90
0.9
0.9
0.2
0.2
0.9
0.7
90–95
1.4
1.3
0.3
0.6
1.3
1.1
95–99
2.6
1.6
1.0
1.5
1.4
1.1
99–100
 1.1
–2.8
–0.5
–0.2
–2.0
–3.4
Percent Change in After–Tax Income by Cash Income Percentile
Source: Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006–1).
(1) Calendar year. Baseline is current law.
16 We do not estimate the number or percentage of tax units with exactly zero tax liability because of limits in 
our underlying dataset. The IRS deliberately “blurs” tax returns for high–income households in the public–use 
tax return data fi le to prevent disclosure. While this has little effect on the precision of revenue estimates or 
distributional tables, it might be more signifi cant for measures of taxpayers with a particular amount of tax 
liability. Because of blurring, some tax units will appear to have a small amount of tax liability when, in fact, 
they were untaxable (and others will appear untaxable when they, in fact, paid a small amount in tax).
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could result in many more high–income 
households with little or no tax liability. 
The best option to address this, however, 
would be to adopt in the regular income 
tax whatever effective anti–tax shelter 
measures exist under the AMT.
The fi nancing of AMT repeal could help 
offset these effects. We discuss fi ve options 
that, coupled with AMT repeal, would be 
approximately revenue–neutral over the 
next decade: (1) imposing a four percent 
of AGI surtax above $200,000 for couples 
($100,000 for singles); (2) repealing the 
state and local tax deduction and reduc-
ing income tax rates by two percent; (3) 
increasing regular income tax rates by six 
percent; (4) increasing regular income tax 
rates in the 25–percent and higher brackets 
by 15 percent; and (5) increasing regular 
income tax rates in the 25–percent and 
higher brackets by 12 percent and repeal-
ing the 2003 tax cuts for capital gains and 
qualifi ed dividends. 
One attractive option would be to 
combine AMT repeal with a four percent 
tax on AGI in excess of $200,000 for mar-
ried couples or $100,000 for other tax 
fi lers.17 This would sharply reduce the 
number of high–income tax fi lers who 
pay no federal income tax. It would be 
approximately revenue–neutral over the 
2007–17 budget window. Through 2010, 
even with the four–percent add–on tax, 
the top effective tax rates on ordinary 
income and capital gains would remain 
below the pre–EGTRRA levels of 39.6 and 
20 percent. 
Overall, in 2007, about three times as 
many people would face a cut in marginal 
tax rates on ordinary income as would face 
higher rates under the option (Table 6). 
Because the surtax rate is relatively small 
in comparison to the large increases in 
marginal tax rates resulting from the AMT, 
eliminating the AMT more than offsets the 
effect of the surtax on marginal tax rates 
for most people who are affected. The 
vast majority of affected taxpayers with 
incomes under $200,000 and more than 
one–third of those affected with incomes 
between $200,000 and $500,000 would 
face lower effective rates. About 90 per-
cent of tax units would see no change in 
their effective capital gains tax rates. For 
those with a change, the majority would 
pay higher rates, but a signifi cant number 
of taxpayers would see a cut because of 
the elimination of the AMT exemption 
phaseout. The bottom line is that, unlike 
a rate increase alone, which would reduce 
incentives to work and save, the proposal 
improves work incentives for most taxpay-
ers and is a mixed bag in terms of saving.
This option is highly progressive. Tax-
payers in the 60th through 99th percentiles 
would, on average, receive a tax cut from 
the proposal through 2010 (Tables 5 and 7). 
Even after 2010, only taxpayers in the top 
fi ve percent would, on average, receive a 
tax increase. And that increase would be 
relatively small for those in the 95th to 99th 
percentiles, amounting to only one–tenth 
of one percent of after–tax income in 2011 
(Table 8). The top one percent would pay 
higher taxes, averaging between 2.8 and 
3.6 percent of after–tax income throughout 
the budget window.
The proposal also has the advantage 
of returning the AMT to its original pur-
pose—guaranteeing that high–income 
people pay at least some tax. Like the 
original minimum tax, the surtax is an 
addition to regular tax rather than an alter-
native tax system. It would be extremely 
simple to calculate. And it would sig-
nifi cantly reduce the number of taxpay-
ers who can avoid income tax altogether 
(although those with income only from 
public–purpose tax–exempt bonds would 
continue to be able to avoid tax).
17 See Burman and Leiserson (2007) for more discussion of this option.
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
400
TABLE 6
OPTIONS TO REPEAL THE AMT
DISTRIBUTION OF TAX UNITS BY CHANGE IN MARGINAL TAX RATE, 20071
Change in Marginal 
Tax Rate on Wages
Change in Marginal 
Tax Rate on Capital Gains
Cash Income Class
 (thousands of 2006 
dollars)2
Repeal AMT
 Less than 100
 100–200
 200–500
 500–1,000
 More than 1,000
 All
Repeal AMT & Implement 4% Surtax on AGI Above 100/200K
 Less than 100
 100–200
 200–500
 500–1,000
 More than 1,000
 All
Repeal AMT, Repeal State and Local Tax Deduction & Reduce Tax Rates by 2%3
 Less than 100
 100–200
 200–500
 500–1,000
 More than 1,000
 All
Repeal AMT & Increase Tax Rates by 6%
 Less than 100
 100–200
 200–500
 500–1,000
 More than 1,000
 All
Repeal AMT & Increase Top Three Tax Rates by 15%
 Less than 100
 100–200
 200–500
 500–1,000
 More than 1,000
 All
Repeal AMT, Roll Back Capital Gains Rates, & Increase Top Three Tax Rates by 12%
 Less than 100
 100–200
 200–500
 500–1,000
 More than 1,000
 All
Percent 
with 
Increase
 0.1
 4.6
20.7
38.9
20.5
 1.4
 0.1
15.2
59.6
83.9
90.8
 4.2
 2.5
10.6
24.3
41.2
22.1
 4.3
58.2
79.4
49.2
88.3
89.2
60.3
 0.2
17.0
68.1
79.9
85.8
 4.7
 1.4
16.0
50.6
82.3
89.6
 5.1
Percent 
with 
Decrease
 5.5
63.0
68.4
17.1
12.0
13.9
 5.5
59.8
34.6
11.0
 7.9
12.5
60.2
88.4
74.0
57.0
75.3
63.5
 4.1
19.3
48.7
 9.9
 8.4
 7.2
 5.5
58.1
24.6
13.7
10.4
12.0
 5.6
61.6
44.7
12.4
 8.6
13.0
Percent 
with No 
Change
94.4
32.4
10.8
44.0
67.5
84.7
94.4
25.0
 5.8
 5.1
 1.4
83.3
37.3
 1.0
 1.8
 1.8
 2.7
32.2
37.6
 1.3
 2.1
 1.9
 2.4
32.5
94.3
24.8
 7.3
 6.5
 3.8
83.3
93.0
22.4
 4.7
 5.3
 1.8
81.8
Percent 
with 
Increase
 1.0
20.7
18.5
32.9
20.1
 3.9
 0.9
25.6
27.8
65.3
69.5
 5.0
 2.8
20.6
11.8
26.7
13.4
 5.2
11.6
30.1
20.3
59.4
57.2
14.2
 0.9
19.7
19.9
58.2
56.6
 4.0
60.0
81.2
35.9
70.7
70.5
61.5
Percent 
with 
Decrease
 1.1
18.5
58.2
 9.7
 4.3
 4.8
 1.1
16.2
48.7
 4.7
 2.6
 4.2
10.8
23.1
63.0
31.8
41.1
13.9
 1.1
11.9
56.1
 6.0
 3.4
 3.9
 1.1
16.4
54.2
 5.9
 3.4
 4.4
 0.4
 9.5
46.8
 4.2
 2.6
 2.9
Percent 
with No 
Change
97.9
60.8
23.3
57.3
75.7
91.3
98.0
58.2
23.5
30.0
27.9
90.8
86.4
56.3
25.1
41.4
45.6
80.9
87.4
58.1
23.6
34.6
39.4
81.8
98.0
63.8
25.9
35.9
39.9
91.6
39.6
 9.2
17.3
25.0
26.9
35.7
Source: Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006–1).
Number of AMT Taxpayers (millions). Baseline: 23.4; Proposals: 0.0.
(1) Calendar year. Baseline is current law.
(2) Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the 
totals. For a description of cash income, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm.
(3) The estimates in this table show marginal rates for federal taxes holding constant state taxes paid. A more 
complete consideration of marginal rates without this limitation would show somewhat different results.
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Instead of increasing effective tax rates, 
repeal could be fi nanced by base broad-
ening under the regular income tax. The 
President’s tax reform panel proposed to 
eliminate the income tax deduction for 
state and local taxes (among many other 
measures) as a way to fi nance AMT repeal. 
The tax deduction is an ineffi cient instru-
ment to help states—primarily benefi ting 
states with high average incomes (since 
lower–income people usually do not item-
ize and, even when they do, the deduction 
is worth little to them because they are in 
low tax brackets).18 Moreover, since the 
tax deduction is an AMT preference, over 
time, fewer and fewer taxpayers would 
be able to gain its full benefi ts under cur-
rent law.
Assuming that the 2001–2006 tax cuts 
expire as scheduled at the end of 2010, 
repealing the state and local tax deduction 
would raise more than enough revenue to 
fi nance AMT repeal, allowing for a two 
percent reduction in income tax rates. The 
net effect of AMT repeal, state and local 
tax deduction repeal, and income tax rate 
reduction has very small effects on overall 
tax burdens by income group (Tables 5, 
7–9). This occurs because, although AMT 
repeal is regressive, repeal of the state and 
local income tax would be quite progres-
sive. Most taxpayers in the bottom 60 
TABLE 7
AMT REPEAL OPTIONS: PERCENT CHANGE IN AFTER–TAX INCOME BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, 
20101
Offset Option
No offset (stand–alone repeal)
4% of AGI add–on tax above 100K/200K
Repeal state and local tax deduction, 
 decrease all income tax rates
Increase all income tax rates
Increase top three income tax rates
Roll back capital gains rates, increase 
 top three income tax rates
0–20
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20–40
 0.0
 0.0
 0.0
–0.1
 0.0
 0.0
40–60
 0.0
 0.0
 0.0
–0.3
 0.0
 0.0
60–80
 0.4
 0.4
 0.2
–0.2
 0.4
 0.3
80–90
1.5
1.4
0.8
0.7
1.4
1.2
90–95
2.1
1.8
1.0
1.2
1.9
1.7
95–99
3.6
2.5
2.1
2.6
2.4
2.1
99–100
 1.4
–2.4
–0.3
 0.1
–1.7
–2.8
Percent Change in After–Tax Income by Cash Income Percentile
Source: Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006–1).
(1) Calendar year. Baseline is current law.
TABLE 8
AMT REPEAL OPTIONS: PERCENT CHANGE IN AFTER–TAX INCOME BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, 
20111
Offset Option
No offset (stand–alone repeal)
4% of AGI add–on tax above 100K/200K
Repeal state and local tax deduction, 
 decrease all income tax rates
Increase all income tax rates
Increase top three income tax rates
Roll back capital gains rates, increase 
 top three income tax rates
0–20
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20–40
 0.0
 0.0
 0.0
–0.2
 0.0
 0.0
40–60
 0.1
 0.1
 0.1
–0.4
 0.1
 0.1
60–80
 0.4
 0.4
 0.0
–0.3
 0.4
 0.4
80–90
 0.6
 0.5
–0.3
–0.3
 0.5
 0.5
90–95
 0.6
 0.3
–0.7
–0.6
 0.3
 0.3
95–99
 1.1
–0.1
–0.6
–0.2
–0.6
–0.3
99–100
 0.7
–3.4
–1.0
–0.9
–3.3
–2.6
Percent Change in After–Tax Income by Cash Income Percentile
Source: Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006–1).
(1) Calendar year. Baseline is current law.
18 See Rueben (2005) for a general discussion, or Burman and Gale (2005) in the context of the proposal made 
by the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (2005).
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percent of the income distribution take the 
standard deduction, so that the primary 
beneficiaries of the state and local tax 
deduction are those at the very top of the 
income scale who escape the AMT.
This option has signifi cant effects on 
marginal tax rates. Almost 64 percent of 
households would face lower marginal 
rates on ordinary income, while almost 
14 percent would pay lower rates on 
capital gains (Table 6). The tax cut on wage 
income arises primarily because of the 
modest reduction in rates and is generally 
small, but also because of eliminating the 
AMT. The tax cuts on capital gains also 
arise from AMT repeal, but also because 
the lower income tax rate means that the 
phaseout of itemized deductions creates 
a slightly (two percent) smaller effective 
tax surcharge than it does under current 
law.19 Interestingly, more people face mar-
ginal rate increases under this option than 
under repeal. This occurs because repeal 
of the deduction pushes some taxpayers 
with modest incomes into higher income 
tax brackets. 
A natural alternative option to consider 
is AMT repeal coupled with an across–the–
board increase in regular income tax rates. 
AMT repeal coupled with the resulting six 
percent (not percentage points) increase 
in regular income tax rates required to 
raise the same revenue would make the 
tax system less progressive than current 
law. In general, it would raise taxes on 
those least likely to owe AMT under cur-
rent law—those in the bottom 80 percent 
of the income distribution—and cut taxes 
substantially on those with incomes in 
the 80th to the 99th percentiles. Unlike the 
other options, this option would increase 
marginal tax rates for most taxpayers. More 
than 60 percent would face higher rates on 
ordinary income and 14 percent would face 
higher rates on capital gains and dividends. 
The latter effect may seem surprising, as 
the option does not directly alter capital 
gains tax rates, but it occurs because of the 
implicit surtax created by the phaseout of 
itemized deductions, which would be six 
percent higher under this option. 
Since repealing the AMT primarily 
benefits higher–income taxpayers, it 
makes sense to offset the revenue losses 
by increasing only top income tax rates. 
Another option would increase statutory 
TABLE 9
AMT REPEAL OPTIONS: PERCENT CHANGE IN AFTER–TAX INCOME BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, 
20171
Offset Option
No offset (stand–alone repeal)
4% of AGI add–on tax above 100K/200K
Repeal state and local tax deduction, 
 decrease all income tax rates
Increase all income tax rates
Increase top three income tax rates
Roll back capital gains rates, increase 
 top three income tax rates
0–20
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
20–40
 0.0
 0.0
 0.1
–0.2
 0.0
 0.0
40–60
 0.3
 0.3
 0.3
–0.2
 0.3
 0.3
60–80
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.2
0.9
0.9
80–90
1.0
0.9
0.1
0.0
0.9
0.9
90–95
1.4
1.1
0.1
0.2
1.0
1.1
95–99
 1.8
 0.3
 0.1
 0.4
–0.2
 0.1
99–100
 0.7
–3.3
–1.0
–0.9
–3.4
–2.7
Percent Change in After–Tax Income by Cash Income Percentile
Source: Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 1006–1).
(1) Calendar year. Baseline is current law.
19 Under current law, itemized deductions phase out at a two–percent rate for taxpayers with incomes above 
certain thresholds ($156,400 for most taxpayers in 2007). Like the phaseout of the AMT exemption, the deduc-
tion phaseout implicitly creates a surtax, which in this case equals two percent of the statutory tax bracket. 
The surtax applies to capital gains as well as ordinary income. Thus, an increase in ordinary income tax rates 
increases the effective tax rate on capital gains and dividends for taxpayers affected by the phaseout. (Note 
that, due to tax law changes in EGTRRA, this provision is being phased out, but it will return at its original 
three–percent rate in 2011 if the tax cuts are not extended.)
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rates of 25 percent or more by 15 percent. 
Through 2010, only the top one percent of 
households face an average tax increase, 
amounting to about two percent of after–
tax income. This occurs because very–
high–income earners are most affected 
by the rate increases and do not tend to 
benefi t as much from repeal of the AMT 
since they tend not to be on the AMT in 
the fi rst place. Through 2010, those in the 
90th to 99th percentiles receive the largest 
average tax cuts under this plan, between 
1.3 and 1.4 percent of after–tax incomes 
in 2007, and between 1.9 and 2.4 percent 
in 2010. By 2017, the regular income tax 
rate increases dominate, and those in the 
top fi ve percent of the income distribution 
receive an average tax increase. 
Finally, AMT repeal could be an oppor-
tunity to rein in tax shelters in the regular 
income tax. For example, rolling back the 
2003 tax cuts on dividends and capital 
gains would reduce somewhat the incen-
tive to convert ordinary income into 
these tax–preferred forms. It would also 
raise some revenue to allow for a smaller 
increase in ordinary income tax rates. 
The top three income tax rates would 
increase by 12 percent under this option. 
The option would cut taxes by a modest 
amount for middle– and upper–mid-
dle–income taxpayers and increase taxes 
signifi cantly for high–income taxpayers, 
especially through 2010 when current 
law allows for substantial reductions in 
the rates on capital gains and dividends. 
Taxpayers in the top one percent of the 
income distribution would, on average, 
pay additional taxes equal to 3.4 percent 
of after–tax income in 2007. These house-
holds lose out for three reasons—they 
are most affected by the income tax rate 
increases, they have a large amount of 
capital gains and dividends, and many 
taxpayers in this group do not owe AMT 
(and, thus, receive no benefi t from repeal). 
After 2010, the tax increase at the very top 
would still be quite substantial, averaging 
about 2.6 percent of after–tax income. In 
2007, taxpayers in the 60th to 99th percen-
tiles would see a modest tax cut, averaging 
between 0.1 and 1.1 percent of after–tax 
income. By 2017, while those in the 60th 
to 95th percentiles continue to benefit 
modestly, taxpayers in the 95th to 99th per-
centiles would, on average, see virtually 
no change in after–tax incomes.
Repeal the Regular Income Tax? 
Some observers have argued that, 
rather than repealing the AMT, a better 
solution would be to repeal the regular 
income tax. The claim is that the AMT 
is nearly a fl at–rate tax with only two 
statutory rates, 26 and 28 percent, both 
of which are signifi cantly lower than the 
top statutory rate of 35 percent under the 
regular income tax. In addition, the AMT 
applies those lower rates to a broader 
income base, since it eliminates various 
special tax breaks that exist in the regular 
tax system. Since the AMT applies lower 
marginal rates to a broader tax base, it is 
a more effi cient way of raising revenue 
than the regular tax system. 
This analysis is incorrect for reasons 
already noted.20 First, the AMT actually 
imposes four marginal tax rates, not two. 
The phaseout of the AMT exemption 
creates higher phantom tax rates of 32.5 
and 35 percent, the latter equal to the top 
rate under the regular income tax.21 Most 
taxpayers face higher effective marginal 
tax rates under the AMT than they would 
under the regular income tax. And the 
20 For more detailed discussion, see Burman and Weiner (2005).
21 Although the AMT generally preserves the lower statutory tax rates on capital gains and qualifi ed dividends 
that exist under the regular tax system, the effect is diminished by the phaseout of the AMT exemption. Rather 
than the advertised 15 percent rate, taxpayers with incomes in the phaseout range can face effective marginal 
tax rates as high as 22 percent on gains and dividends. See Leiserson (2007) for details.
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relatively high AMT exemption actually 
means that the AMT tax base is often 
smaller than the regular income tax base. 
The AMT is far from the broad–base, low–
rate tax system that tax reformers seek. In 
addition, it is worth noting that the AMT 
contains substantial marriage and family 
penalties and is not indexed for infl ation, 
hardly the features one would want in a 
tax system. Lastly, if the regular income 
tax were repealed, AMT rates would have 
to rise by about 11 percent to maintain 
revenue–neutrality through 2017. 
One could begin to reform the AMT 
by indexing it for infl ation, eliminating 
marriage and family penalties, eliminat-
ing the phaseout of the exemption and 
raising rates to account for the revenue 
loss from those items and from the repeal 
of the regular income tax. But a better 
option might be to simply incorporate the 
AMT’s most desirable features into the 
regular income tax. As we showed in the 
case of the state and local tax deduction, 
this base–broadening approach has the 
added virtue of allowing for cuts in mar-
ginal income tax rates while maintaining 
revenue neutrality.
CONCLUSION
Although the goals of the AMT—ensur-
ing high–income taxpayers pay at least 
some amount of tax each year, and 
reducing ineffi cient tax sheltering—may 
command public support, the AMT is a 
highly imperfect way of achieving those 
goals. In particular, under current law, the 
AMT will come to plague the middle– and 
upper–middle–income classes with undue 
complexity, a narrower tax base, and 
higher marginal tax rates than under the 
regular income tax.
As the AMT expands, though, the 
political benefi ts of achieving a solution 
increase as well. We show that a number of 
revenue–neutral repeal options are avail-
able. All of these plans produce winners 
and losers—it would be impossible to 
design a sensible revenue–neutral alterna-
tive to the AMT that does not—but many 
would cut taxes modestly on the middle 
class, have relatively small effects on 
many of those with higher incomes, and 
reduce the number of high–income fi lers 
who pay no taxes.
Acknowledgments 
The authors thank Roberta Mann, 
Kim Rueben, Jerry Tempalski, David 
Weiner, Bob Williams and participants 
at the National Tax Association Spring 
Symposium for helpful comments and 
suggestions. Views expressed are those of 
the authors alone and do not necessarily 
refl ect the views of the Urban Institute, 
the Brookings Institution, their boards, 
or their funders. 
REFERENCES
Balkovic, Brian.
 “High–Income Tax Returns for 2003.” SOI 
Bulletin 25 No. 4 (Spring, 2006): 8–57.
Burman, Leonard E. 
 The Labyrinth of Capital Gains Tax Policy: A 
Guide for the Perplexed. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999.
Burman, Leonard E., and William G. Gale.
 “A Preliminary Evaluation of the Tax Re-
form Panel’s Report.” Tax Notes 109 No. 10 
(December 5, 2005): 1349–68.
Burman, Leonard E., and Greg Leiserson.
 “A Simple, Progressive Replacement 
for the AMT.” Washington, D.C.: The 
Urban Institute, 2007. http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/publications/template.
cfm?PubID=1001081.
Burman, Leonard E., and David Weiner. 
 “Suppose They Took the AM Out of the 
AMT?” Tax Policy Center Discussion Paper 
No. 25. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Insti-
tute, 2005.
Burman, Leonard E., William G. Gale, 
Greg Leiserson, and Jeffrey Rohaly. 
 “Options to Fix the AMT.” Washington, 
D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2007. http://
The AMT: What’s Wrong and How to Fix It
405
www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/
template.cfm?PubID=9986.
Gale, William G., and Janet Holtzblatt. 
 “The Role of Administrative Factors in Tax 
Reform: Simplicity, Compliance, and Ad-
ministration.” In United States Tax Reform in 
the Twenty–First Century, edited by George 
R. Zodrow and Peter Mieszkowski, 179–214. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002.
Graetz, Michael J. 
 The U.S. Income Tax: What It Is, How It Got 
that Way, and Where We Go from Here. New 
York: Norton, 1999.
Graetz, Michael J., and Emil Sunley. 
 “Minimum Taxes and Comprehensive 
Tax Reform.” In Uneasy Compromise: Prob-
lems of a Hybrid Income–Consumption Tax, 
edited by Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, 
and Joseph Pechman, 385–419. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
1988.
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
 “Annual Report from the Commissioner of 
the Internal Revenue Service on Tax Law 
Complexity.” Internal Revenue Service. 
Mimeo, 2000. 
Johnston, David Cay. 
 Perfectly Legal: The Covert Campaign to Rig 
Our Tax System to Benefi t the Super Rich—and 
Cheat Everybody Else. New York: Penguin, 
2003.
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).
 “Present Law and Background Relating to 
the Individual Alternative Minimum Tax.” 
JCX–10–07. Washington, D.C.: Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation, 2007.
Leiserson, Greg. 
 “The 15 Percent Rate on Capital Gains: 
A Casualty of the Alternative Minimum 
Tax.” Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 
2007. http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
publications/template.cfm?PubID = 
901052.
Leiserson, Greg, and Jeffrey Rohaly. 
 “The Distribution of the 2001–2006 Tax Cuts: 
Updated Projections, November 2006.” 
Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2006. 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publica-
tions/template.cfm?PubID=411378.
Lindsey, Lawrence B. 
 “Governor Bush’s Proposal and the Alter-
native Minimum Tax.” Tax Notes 86 No. 4 
(January 24, 2000): 553–7.
Lyon, Andrew B. 
 “Cracking the Code: Making Sense of the 
Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax.” 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu-
tion, 1997.
National Taxpayer Advocate. 
 “National Taxpayer Advocate’s Fiscal Year 
2001 Annual Report to Congress.” Internal 
Revenue Service. Mimeo, 2001.
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
Reform. 
 “Simple, Fair, and Pro–Growth: Proposals 
to Fix America’s Tax System.” Washington, 
D.C.: President’s Advisory Panel on Federal 
Tax Reform, 2005.
Rohaly, Jeffrey, Adam Carasso, and 
Mohammed Adeel Saleem. 
 “The Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center 
Microsimulation Model: Documentation and 
Methodology for Version 0304.” Washing-
ton, DC: The Urban Institute, 2005. http://
www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411136.
Rueben, Kim. 
 “The Impact of Repealing State and 
Local Tax Deductibility.” State Tax Notes 37 
(August 15, 2005): 497–513.
Shaviro, Daniel. 
 “The New Alternative Minimum Tax: Per-
ception, Reality, and Strategy.” TAXES No. 
66 (1988): 91–113.
Shaviro, Daniel. 
 “Tax Simplification and the Alternative 
Minimum Tax.” Tax Notes 91 No. 10 (May 
28, 2001): 1455–68.

